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1 Introduction
Do higher energy prices cause sectors to lose industrial export competitiveness? The rising
price of energy remains a politically sensitive issue, particularly in energy import dependent
regions such as Europe and Japan. Several new trends contribute to this: the slow recovery
since the 2008 financial crisis, the shale gas boom in the US with the consequent fall in energy
prices for US manufacturers, the costly transition from fossil fuel and nuclear to renewable
energy sources notably in Europe, and the increased competition from emerging economies.
Standard trade models predict that by making domestic production more costly, policies
that increase energy price will put domestic firms at a strategic disadvantage relative to
foreign rivals facing lower energy prices. This result forms the basis of the so-called Pollution
Haven Hypothesis (Taylor & Copeland, 2004; Levinson & Taylor, 2008), which postulates
that uneven environmental policies influence the distribution of polluting industries between
countries. According to this theory, producers of energy intensive products respond to higher
energy prices by producing fewer energy-intensive goods which may lead to a decline in net
exports and the partial relocation of production to a region with low energy prices (Hanna,
2010). However, energy costs are only one of many factors that influence imports and
relocation. These include labor costs, infrastructures, institutions, proximity to customers,
and many others (Demailly & Quirion, 2008). For this reason, the extent to which changes in
relative energy prices might influence trade and competitiveness is unclear and is partly an
empirical question. The objective of this paper is to determine the magnitude of this impact
using historical data on trade and energy prices from 1996 to 2011 covering 42 countries and
62 sectors representing 60% of global merchandise trade during that period.
The question of whether trade has historically responded to energy price differences remains
largely unanswered empirically. As a consequence, our understanding of the impact of
regional asymmetries in carbon prices on trade is limited, as is our understanding of
the environmental efficacy of such policies. Yet, as countries implement carbon pricing
policies at different speeds, there is considerable interest in assessing the potential trade
impacts of climate change mitigation policies, particularly for energy intensive trade-exposed
sectors. The literature on the links between climate policy and international trade1 and
in particular on “carbon leakage” (whether part of the emissions reductions achieved by
a carbon emissions reduction policy is directly offset by an increase in emissions outside
of the regulated region) has so far relied on ex-ante model simulation strategies, typically
using CGE models2 (e.g. Babiker, 2005; Burniaux & Martins, 2000; Gerlagh & Kuik, 2007;
1See Levinson & Taylor (2008); Levinson (2010) ; Copeland & Taylor (2003); Jaffe et al. (1995); Jeppesen et al.
(2002) for reviews of the wider literature on effects of environmental policies on trade.
2See Dröge (2009) and Zhou et al. (2010) for a review of this literature.This group of studies simulate different
emission reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol and have estimated a wide range of carbon leakage rates.
2
Kuik & Gerlagh, 2003; Paltsev, 2001) or partial equilibrium analysis in the context of the
EU ETS3 (e.g. Demailly & Quirion, 2008; Monjon & Quirion, 2009; Demailly & Quirion,
2006; Hourcade et al., 2007) but the results are decisively mixed, highlighting the need for
empirical analysis in order to better understand the nature and magnitude of these effects.
The lack of empirical evidence may be attributable to several factors. Firstly, although
carbon mitigation policies targeting industry sector emissions have recently proliferated
across the world – including the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS),
New Zealand’s ETS, the UK’s Climate Change Levy, California’s climate programme, British
Columbia’s carbon tax scheme and China’s pilot emissions trading schemes – the nascent
nature of the majority of schemes means there is a lack of observed data. An exception
is the Kyoto protocol which was ratified in 1997. Aichele & Felbermayr (2012) derive a
gravity equation for the carbon content of trade and find that commitment to the Kyoto
protocol is associated with a decrease in domestic emissions by 7%, but also with an increase
in the share of imported embodied carbon emissions over domestic emissions by about
14%. Using a matching method, Aichele & Felbermayr (2011) finds that Kyoto countries’
exports are reduced by 14% compared to a counterfactual scenario. However, since the paper
uses country-level data a concern is that the Kyoto dummy variable also captures other
macro-economic shocks correlated with both exports and Kyoto ratification, such as China’s
accession to the WTO in 2002 (Branger & Quirion, 2013). Secondly, where carbon prices
have existed, the levels have been low, preventing researchers from disentangling the effect
of small carbon prices from the multitude of more dominant factors that drive trade and
investment decisions, such as exchange rates, transport costs, trade agreements, and relative
costs of labour, capital and other input costs. Thirdly, it is difficult to compare the relative
stringency of existing carbon pricing policies in a meaningful way. Complications arise, for
example, in the EU ETS where allowances were allocated for free to most sectors in the first
two implementing phases.
This paper aims to overcome these limitations and to establish whether changes in energy
price differences between trading partners affect trade flows between these countries, based
Central estimates are in the range of 5–25% according to Dröge (2009) and 15–30% according to Lanz et al.
(2011). However, in some cases, models report leakage rates below zero because of positive emission effects in
the model, which are due to the role of technology spillover from mitigation (Barker et al., 2007). Others report
leakage rates above 100%, which imply that emission reduction efforts in one region leads to more global GHG
emissions rather than less (if production moves to regions with less efficient technology for example).
3These studies examine the potential impacts of climate policies on trade and investment for heavy industry
and highlight sectoral differences in carbon leakage rates estimated in these models reflect the differences in
parameters such as carbon intensity of production, abatement potential, ability to pass through abatement costs
to consumers, as well as different levels of sensitivity to multiple barriers of trade (e.g. product differentiation,
service differentiation, transport costs, capacity constraints and import restrictions). Higher carbon leakage rates
are estimated for the steel sector which exhibit high product differentiation but also higher abatement potential,
relative to the cement sector, which is characterised by homogeneous products but high transport costs relative
to value.
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on a large dataset covering 42 countries at varying levels of economic development (over
1600 country pairs) and 62 sectors for the period 1996 to 2011. Contrary to the stringency of
climate change regulations, energy prices have the advantage of being comparable across
countries, sectors and time, and to be available for a large set of countries and a long time
period. Following Aldy & Pizer (2011), we postulate that historic asymmetries in industrial
energy prices offer insights into the impact of asymmetric carbon prices in the future,
owing to the fact that carbon prices work by increasing the effective price of energy for
industry. The analysis is conducted at the sector level, allowing us to control for country-level
macroeconomic shocks and for factors that affect bilateral trade and might be correlated
with energy price differences, such as exchange rates, transport costs, trade agreements,
and relative labour costs. The richness of the data allows us to include a large range of
country, sector and time fixed effects, thereby purging the estimates from a range of potential
confounding factors.
This paper contributes to a small recent literature which seeks to empirically examine the
relationship between historic energy prices and trade. Aldy & Pizer (2011) focus on the
US and use historical variation in industrial electricity price across states to investigate its
effect on sectoral production and consumption. This enables an empirical investigation of
the impact of carbon pricing on US industrial supply and demand, despite the absence of
carbon pricing in the US historically. They show that an increase in energy prices in the US
following the introduction of a 15$/ton carbon tax would induce a domestic production
decline of between 3 and 4 percent among energy-intensive sectors and a roughly 1 percent
increase in imports. The authors also find evidence that responses to energy prices are bigger
for industries with higher energy intensity. Gerlagh & Mathys (2011) use a country specific
energy abundance measure to proxy for marginal energy costs, and investigate its impact on
net exports using a panel of 14 high income (OECD) countries over 28 years. The authors
find that there is high correlation between energy abundance and price, and that energy
abundant countries have a high level of energy embodied in exports relative to imports.
These results therefore provide support to the existence of a carbon leakage effect. Our paper
builds on these studies, using a much wider dataset, covering 62 sectors in 42 countries over
15 years.
We find evidence that a widening of the energy price gap has a statistically significant
but small effect on bilateral exports: a 10% increase in the energy price gap between two
countries within a given sector translates on average into a 0.2% increase in imports. This
result is robust across a wide range of alternative model specifications and estimators.
Consistent with expectations, we find that energy price differences have a larger impact on
trade in energy-intensive sectors. However, even in these sectors the impact is small. Overall,
energy price differences across time explain less than 0.01% of the variation in trade flows,
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suggesting that differences in energy prices are a marginal driver of trade globally.
We also use our estimates to conduct policy simulations and evaluate the degree to which
stricter carbon pricing policies in Europe would affect trade patterns. Our results suggest
that a †40-65/tCO2 price of carbon in the EU ETS would increase Europe’s imports from
the rest of the world by around 0.04% and decrease exports by 0.2%. To put things into
perspective, consider that imports from European countries have grown at an average annual
rate of 6.5% between 1995 and 2011 and at the rate of 15.6% since 2009. Hence, the impact of
higher EU ETS prices on European imports would appear to be small compared with other
drivers of trade.
This paper has important policy implications. It suggests that concerns about carbon leakage
are not unfounded but may have been largely overplayed. While efforts to price carbon are
spreading globally, governments are consistently pressured to compensate energy intensive
trade-exposed sectors, because of the assumed adverse impacts of climate change policies on
their export competitiveness. European industries actively lobby for continued free allocation
of permits within the EU ETS and in the US, proposals to use output-based allocation for
the upcoming emission trading schemes are also justified on fear of leakage effects, although
subsidising output reduces efficiency of the overall system as it shields product prices from
the real cost of carbon (Fischer & Fox, 2007; Hepburn et al., 2006). Our results suggest that,
although energy price differences have some impact on trade, the magnitude of this effect is
small, in particular when compared to other factors affecting trade relationships.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents our conceptual framework and
empirical strategy. The data is described in Section 3. Section 4 reports and discusses the
empirical results and the magnitude of the effect. In Section 5 we use our estimations results
to simulate the impact of a higher carbon price in the EU ETS on European imports and
exports. The final section offers some concluding remarks.
2 Conceptual framework and empirical strategy
2.1 Conceptual framework
A large theoretical literature has investigated the consequences of unequal environmental
regulatory stringency on trade and competitiveness. Most models consider a local pollutant
that is emitted during the production process of the final good and pollution emissions
taxes imposed to reduce polluting emissions, but the framework equally applies to energy
or carbon taxes implemented to reduce carbon emissions. Standard models predict that by
making domestic production more costly, policies that increase energy price will put domestic
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firms at a strategic disadvantage relative to foreign rivals if companies are competing with
foreign counterparts with lower energy prices. This results forms the basis of the so-
called Pollution Haven Hypothesis (Taylor & Copeland, 2004; Levinson & Taylor, 2008).
For producers of energy intensive products, higher energy prices could increase marginal
production costs considerably. Depending on the degree to which they can pass the increased
costs onto the consumer (i.e. the degree of competition they face) and on the magnitude and
persistence of the energy price difference vis-a-vis their competitors, they may respond by
producing fewer energy-intensive goods, which may lead to a decline in net exports and the
partial relocation of production to a region with low energy prices (Hanna, 2010). 4
It is easy to see that in a model where two countries are identical except for differences in
environmental policy (or energy taxes), the country with weaker policy will specialise in
the production of the polluting good, and export that good to the “virtuous” country. In
practice, however, many factors influence production costs, including labor costs, infrastruc-
tures, institutions, and proximity to customers (Demailly & Quirion, 2008). Hence, only
if environmental costs dominate these other costs would one expect a change in relative
environmental policy stringency to induce some relocation of activities (Copeland & Taylor,
2003). Another possibility is that even if marginal production costs increase, producers
may be able to pass on the increase in energy prices to their consumers because of high
transport costs or product differentiation from imports such that their trade and investment
decisions are unaffected by rising energy costs. The Porter hypothesis (Porter, 1991; Porter
& van der Linde, 1995) even asserts that environmental regulations, by inducing firms to
innovate in new pollution-control technologies, might have a positive impact on productivity
and profitability, which may increase firms’ export competitiveness. Hence, understanding
the relationship between changes in relative energy prices and trade is partly an empirical
question.
2.2 Empirical approach
In this paper we estimate the reduced-form short-term effects of energy price differences on
bilateral trade at the sector level. Relative industrial energy prices affect trade flows through
the induced change in relative production costs between trading partners. Because carbon
prices work by increasing the effective cost of energy for industry, the results can be used to
infer the effects of potential asymmetries in carbon price on future trade patterns5, with the
4In a general equilibrium framework, sectors unaffected by pollution taxes then benefit from factor reallocation
and could then see an increase in net exports.
5This is because the level of carbon emissions are largely attributable to energy combustion in production
(although in some processes, there are non-energy related emissions also such as process emissions in cement
production).
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obvious limitation that it is not possible to simulate the impact of carbon price differences
larger than what has been observed in the past. This is useful because while experience
with carbon prices is still limited globally, historic data on industrial energy prices exists for
many countries and many years. Moreover, Sato et al. (2015) show that most of the variation
in energy price differences between countries comes from variation in energy taxes. Hence,
energy price differences reflect differences in energy and carbon policies between countries.
We use a gravity framework and, in line with the recent empirical trade literature, we
estimate the gravity equation in its multiplicative form (Santos Silva & Tenreyro, 2006). Since
the value of trade between two countries in any period is a non-negative integer, it is natural
to model the conditional mean as a log-link function of explanatory factors and use a Poisson
maximum likelihood estimator.6Our empirical model is:
importsijst = exp(lp
n
Â
p=1
importsijs(t p) + b1epgapijct 1 + b2gdptijt 1 + b3gdpsimijt 1
+b4r f acijt 1 + b5wagegapijct 1 + b6reerratioijt 1)hijs + vijst (1)
where importsijst is the value of annual imports by country i from country j for sector s at
time t and vijst is the error term. Our main variable of interest, the difference in energy price
between two trading partners, is defined as epgapijst 1 which is the difference in the logs of
energy prices, or in other words the log of the ratio of energy prices:
epgapijst 1 = ln(EPist 1)  ln(EPjst 1)
where EPist 1 and EPjst 1 are the real industrial energy price respectively in country i and
j in sector s at time t  1. A positive value of epgapijst 1 implies that the importer i has a
higher industrial energy price than the exporter. We lag prices by a year to reflect delayed
response and also mitigate contemporaneous feedback effects. The primary objective of the
study is to estimate the coefficient b1.
The choice of control variables is derived from recent advances in the gravity literature. First,
we control for overall bilateral economic size, relative economic size (similarity of GDP) as
well as differences in relative factor endowments (similarity of capital-labour ratios) (Baltagi
et al., 2003; Wang et al., 2010; Egger, 2000). These three variables are specified as follows:
6Non-linear models initially developed for count data analysis can be successfully applied to continuous
variables such as trade data (Wooldridge, 2010). Studies have shown that log-linearised models estimated by
OLS can be inefficient and biased where the data is heteroskedastic (Santos Silva & Tenreyro, 2006), as is often
the case with bilateral trade data.
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Overall bilateral economic size reflects the fact that the volume of exports should be higher,
the bigger the overall market size. gdpsimijt measures the similarity in the levels of GDP
in the trading partners, hence captures the relative size of the two trading partners. Before
the log-linear transformation, this variable can take the value between 0 and 0.5. A higher
value indicates that the two trading partners are similar in size (GDP), with 0.5 indicating
equal country size. Theory predicts that the higher this value, the greater the expected
share of inter-industry trade (Egger, 2000). r f acijt measures the similarity in capital-labour
ratios, or in other words, the relative factor endowments. A value of 0 represents equal
factor endowments proportion. Bergstrand (1990) illustrates empirically using the gravity
model that bilateral trade between high income countries is positively related to similarity
in relative factor endowments (reflecting similarity in preferences). In addition, we control
for two idiosyncratic factors that might be correlated with energy price differences: the
country-pair-sector specific difference in wages and the country pair specific real effective
exchange rate ratio defined as follows:
wagegapijst = ln(wageist)  ln(wagejst)
reerratioijt = ln(reerit)  ln(reerjt)
where wageist and wagejst are the average real wage in country i and j in sector s in year t
expressed in current USD and reerit and reerjt are the real effective exchange rates in country
i and j at time t against the US dollar. A positive value of wagegapijst implies that the
importer i has a higher real wage price than the exporter. The FDI and industry location
literature, as well as the trade literature have examined the role of labour price differentials
in international trade patterns and found mixed evidence on their effect (Baltagi et al., 2007).
Exchange rate dynamics have also been explored as a possible determinant of international
trade decisions Egger & Egger (2005).
As is common with trade data, the sectoral trade data used in this analysis displays strong
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persistence. Thus it is important to account for trade in past periods, by including lags of the
dependent variable. Lagged dependent variables enter as Ânp=1 importsijs(t p), where n is the
number of lags. We experimented with different values of n and use n = 3 in our baseline
specification for the reason that the coefficient on the lagged dependent variables becomes
statistically insignificant from n = 4 onwards, but we test the sensitivity of our results to this
choice.
To minimise the possibility of biases due to omitted variables, our model includes country-
pair-sector fixed effects hijs, to control for time invariant country pair-specific determinants
(such as distance, common language, common borders, common currency, colonial ties)
but also for sector specific characteristics such as product differentiation, market structure,
transportation costs and trade intensity.
2.3 Dynamic count data models with fixed effects
Accounting both for dynamics and fixed effects in count data models raises a number of
issues. Introducing lagged dependent variables violates the strict exogeneity assumption
which makes the Hausman et al. (1984) fixed effect method (the count data equivalent to
the within groups estimator) unsuitable as it requires strict exogeneity. To simultaneously
account for fixed effects and lagged dependent variables we use the pre-sample mean count
data estimator introduced by Blundell et al. (1999) and Blundell et al. (2002), who suggest
conditioning on the pre-sample average of the dependent variable to proxy out the fixed
effect. Applications to environmental issues include Jug & Mirza (2005) and Egger et al.
(2011). The pre-sample mean estimator requires long pre-sample history of realisations of
the dependant variable and is thus particularly suitable to the study of trade data. Because
the pre-sample average of the dependent variable may fail to capture every aspect of time-
invariant country-pair heterogeneity, we include standard gravity variables (including the
log of population-weighted geographical distance, contiguity, common official language and
common currency) as well as importer, exporter and sector dummy variables. The inclusion
of this large set of dummy variables combined with the skewed distribution of the dependent
variable poses computational problems to which the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood
(PPML) estimator developed by Santos Silva & Tenreyro (2006) offers an attractive solution.
Santos Silva & Tenreyro (2006) show that the model can provide a consistent estimator of
bilateral trade in gravity models. However, we check the robustness of our results to the use
of alternative estimators.
9
3 Data and descriptive statistics
3.1 Data
This paper brings together a variety of datasets to determine the impact of relative energy
prices on trade. Our panel covers 42 countries (including high, middle and low income)
and 62 sectors for the period 1996 to 2011. The data is disaggregated at 2-digit sector
resolution using SITC Revision 3 (see Appendix for a list of countries and sectors). The
energy price data can only be disaggregated at a broader level, and we have prices for 12
sectors incorporating the 62 sectors at which the analysis is carried out.
Bilateral trade data
Bilateral trade data is taken from the CEPII’s BACI database7 which contains detailed
bilateral import and export statistics from the UN Commodity Trade (COMTRADE) database.
Although the trade data is available at a more granular level, the chosen level reflects a
trade-off between several considerations. A finer level of sector disaggregation can be
advantageous particularly for heterogeneous sectors, enabling to control for sub-sector
specific characteristics. However, moving to the three or four-digit level substantially
increases the number of zero or missing values in the dependent variable and results in a
very skewed distribution. At 62 sector level, there are no observations with zero or missing
trade, and the share of observations where the trade in value is very small (less than 0.01
million USD) is around 5%, which is manageable for the estimation techniques used.
Depending on the year, the bilateral trade data in the sample covers between 55 and 65% of
world trade obtained from the WTO Statistics Database (World Trade Organisation, 2012).
Exports (in value terms) on an aggregate level rose steadily during the 1990s decade from
$3,515 billion USD in 1991 to $6,494 billion in 2002. It then increased at a faster rate until
disrupted by the financial crisis and subsequent economic recession in 2008, when world
exports fell sharply (dropping from $16,140 billion to $12,542 billion between 2008 and 2009).
Since 2009, aggregate exports have been on an upward trend again, reaching $18,255 billion
in 2011.
Energy prices
The energy price data is obtained from Sato et al. (2015) who construct an energy price
index for a given sector s in country i in year t, by weighting fuel prices for four carriers (oil,
7http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=1
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Figure 1: Cross-country differences in the energy prices (including tax) for average industry, for 10
sample countries
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gas, coal and electricity) by the consumption of each fuel type in that sector-country (si),
thereby addressing the important issue of heterogenous fuel mix observed across sectors and
countries. It therefore captures the change in energy price level (including taxes) over time
for a specific country-sector. This is useful because data on energy prices faced by different
industrial sectors are hard to obtain for most countries, while energy price for electricity
generation and households are readily available. For most OECD countries, industrial energy
prices are published only at the country level (averaged across all industrial sectors) rather
than for individuals sectors, and often with considerable missing data points. The energy
price index uses fixed fuel weights (representing fuel consumption in 2005) over time hence
captures the within-sector variation, and uses transparent and consistent methods to reduce
missing data-points as documented in Sato et al. (2015). The fuel prices are transformed into
logs before applying the fuel weights hence the resulting energy price index is not expressed
in monetary units8. A version of the energy price in USD/TOE terms using variable fuel
weights – hence corresponding to observed energy prices faced by industry – also available
from Sato et al. (2015) is shown in Figure 1.
8It is important for econometric analysis to keep the weights fixed so that the only variation in the price
variable comes from underlying variations in energy prices. The results are robust however to using the variable
weights version of the energy price variable.
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The price index uses industrial energy price data from the IEA Energy End-Use Prices
database (IEA, 2012a) as the primary source of fuel price data for industrial sectors. This
represents the final industrial energy prices including taxes paid by industry for different
fuels and excluding VAT and recoverable taxes and levies and is expressed in real terms
(underlying prices are net of inflation).9 The sector level fuel consumption data is taken
from the IEA World Energy Balances (IEA, 2012a). It is important to note that this industrial
energy price index represents an approximation of the true prices paid by each sector and
may not be the true prices, for example because some countries offer tax exemptions and
other subsidies to energy users. However, in the absence of comprehensive data on observed
energy price data at the sector level, it provides a good alternative solution.
There has historically been considerable variation in industrial energy prices across countries
as shown in Figure 1. In 2001, prices were below 600US$/TOE in the USA, South Korea,
India, Indonesia and France, but were twice as high in Italy and Japan. While real industrial
energy prices remained relatively unchanged over the next decade (below 800US$/TOW
in 2008) for Canada, South Korea, USA, India and Indonesia, in contrast, prices tended to
rise for Italy, France, Mexico, Brazil and Japan but went down in Canada and India. As a
consequence, there has been considerable variation across time in energy price differences
that we can exploit in our empirical setting.
Other data
GDP and population data are obtained form the International Monetary Fund’s World
Economic Outlook (IMF, 2012). 10 GDP data are available in US$ in current prices. These
are converted into real prices using the GDP deflator index, which is also available from the
same database. Because the latter has different base years for different countries, we adjust
the deflator index, using 2005 as the baseline for all countries.
Data on wages were obtained from United Nations Industrial Development Organization
(2011). It was constructed by deflating nominal annual wage by sector using a GDP deflator
variable from the World Bank, then converting to constant US dollars (2005) using exchange
rate data from UNIDO. Data on the real effective exchange rates (reer) are taken from Darvas
9The IEA defines the published industrial energy prices as “the average of amounts paid for the industrial
and manufacturing sectors” and “include transport costs to the consumer; are prices actually paid (i.e. net of
rebates) and; include taxes which have to be paid by the consumer as part of the transaction and which are
not refundable. This excludes value added tax (VAT) paid in many European countries by industry (including
electric power stations) and commercial end-users for all goods and services (including energy). In these cases
VAT is refunded to the customer, usually in the form of a tax credit. Therefore, it is not included in the prices
and taxes columns in the tables.” (IEA, 2012b).
10For Taiwan, GDP data was obtained from Taiwan national statistics (National Statistics of Republic of China
(Taiwan), 2012).
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Overall Between WithinMean SD Min Max SD Min Max SD Min Maxtradeijst 106.726 720.863 0.001 97522.29 624.083 0.001 50421.11 210.041 924169.8 47270.91epgapijst91 90.005 0.623 92.505 2.505 0.624 92.504 2.504 0.141 90.785 0.791wagegapijst91 90.039 1.838 97.459 8.909 1.823 96.294 8.741 0.127 93.23 3.25reerratioijst91 90.001 0.157 90.742 0.742 0.128 0.63 0.742 0.096 0.481 0.557gdptijt91 9.203 2.439 3.571 14.934 2.41 3.597 14.847 0.085 8.839 9.586gdpsimijt91 92.414 2.005 911.135 90.693 2.006 911.135 90.693 0.052 92.921 92.217rfacijt91 2.097 2.007 0.0006 9.602 1.935 0.004 9.576 0.063 1.797 2.462
Notes: These are the values from our regression sample of 348771 observations across 64763 country pair sectors,
between 2001 and 2011.
(2012). Finally, standard gravity model variables are obtained from the Gravity Dataset
provided by CEPII (CEPII, 2012).
3.2 Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics for our estimation sample are provided in Table 1. At the country-pair-
sector level, there is considerable variation in exports as shown in the first row. With a mean
of $112 million, bilateral exports at sector level range from zero up to over $97 billion. More
variation comes from the sector heterogeneity (in trade intensity and value) than from the
bilateral-pair heterogeneity.
The variation in the energy price gap variable is shown in the second row of Table 1. The
mean is zero because of the symmetrical nature of the data – the energy price gap between
US and UK is expressed as a negative value when considering UK imports to the US, and
as a positive value of the same magnitude when considering US imports to the UK. The
within-group standard deviation of the energy price ratio is high, suggesting that historical
fluctuations in the energy price gap, due not to climate policies but to underlying factors
(e.g. energy taxes, energy supply and demand), have been considerable.
As Table 1 shows, the between country-pair-sectors variation is greater than the within
variation for all variables, highlighting the importance of using panel data to control for
heterogeneity across country-pairs and sectors.
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4 Regression results
4.1 All sectors
Table 2 presents our main estimation results. We construct the pre-sample mean of the
dependent variable over the years 1996 to 2000 and estimate over the period 2001-2011 using
Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood.
Column (1) shows that the coefficient on the lagged (tax inclusive) energy price gap is
positive and significant. This result is robust to controlling for the wage difference between
countries i and j (column 2), for the exchange rate (column 3), and for both (column 4). The
elasticity of 0.021 implies that a 10% higher energy price gap is associated with about 0.21%
more imports. The control variables have signs that are consistent with expectations. We
find that the use of a dynamic panel estimator is important, as the coefficients for the lagged
dependent variables always exhibit a parameter estimate which is significantly different
from zero. This suggests that there is indeed strong ’think-back’ or ’stickiness’ in the level of
sectoral trade between two countries as found in recent literature (Olivero & Yotov, 2010,
2012). Increases in total economic mass increases bilateral exports, and the similarity in
GDP also tends to increase trade. The positive coefficient on the latter suggests existence
of intra-industry trade. The coefficient on r f acijt is negative, suggesting that bilateral trade
is negatively related to differences in relative factor endowments, in line with the Linder
hypothesis. The coefficient on the wage gap is not statistically different from zero, perhaps
because wages are only a small fraction of production costs in many industrial sectors.
The real exchange rate ratio is positive and significant, suggesting that real exchange rate
dynamics is an important determinant of bilateral trade flows.
In summary, the results from table 2 offer support to the hypothesis that the energy price
gap has a positive and significant effect on bilateral trade. In other words, imports in sector
s increase in response to the rise in energy prices in the importing country relative to the
exporting country. In terms of magnitudes, our results suggest that a 10% increase in the
importer’s energy price relative to the exporter is associated with a 0.2% increase in imports.
Thus, this effect is statistically significant but very small. We return to this point in Section
4.3.
4.2 Examining sector heterogeneity
The results presented in section 4.1 present the average impact of energy price differences
on imports across all sectors. However, it is likely that this impact differs across sectors
depending on their energy intensity. The importance of sector heterogeneity in the trade
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Table 2: Results for all sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4)0.011* 0.011** 0.021*** 0.021***(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Control'variables 0.014 0.001(0.009) (0.009)0.053** 0.053**(0.025) (0.027).0.007*** .0.007*** .0.003 .0.003(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002).0.262*** .0.168* 0.114 0.114(0.089) (0.095) (0.075) (0.096).0.135*** .0.088* 0.053 0.053(0.045) (0.047) (0.038) (0.048)
Gravity'Variables .0.012*** .0.011*** .0.019*** .0.018**(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007).0.004 .0.003 .0.008 .0.006(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.016)0.006 0.007 .0.003 0.018*(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.010)0.005 0.004 0.009 0.002(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.012)
Lagged'dep.'Vars. 0.899*** 0.895*** 0.880*** 0.860***(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.015)0.051*** 0.054*** 0.058*** 0.074***(0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.020)0.036*** 0.035*** 0.041*** 0.055***(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015)Country.pair:sect.:FE Presamp Presamp Presamp PresampImporter:and:exporter:dum. Yes Yes Yes YesSector:fixed:effects Yes Yes Yes YesYear:FE Yes Yes Yes YesObservations 333055 329873 317469 317382
Trade_ij(t.3)
DistanceCommon:currencyContiguityCommon:official:lang.
Trade_ij(t.1)Trade_ij(t.2)
GDP:similarity
Eenergy:price:gap
Wage:gapReal:eff.:ex:rate:ratioRelative:fact.:endow.GDP:total
Notes: *,**,***= significant at 10,% 5%, 1%. Standard errors clustered at the country pair level in parentheses.
The dependent variable is the value of annual bilateral imports in all columns. Estimation is by Poisson pseudo-
maximum likelihood. The country-pair-sector fixed effect is a pre-sample mean of the dependent variable over
the years 1996-2000. All regressions include controls for relative factor endowments, overall economic size of the
two trading partners, GDP similarity, population weighted distance between the trading partners, and dummies
for common currency, contiguity and common official language. All regressions include dummies for years,
importer, exporter, and sectors. Column (2) and (4) also controls for wage differences, and columns (3) and (4)
control for the real effective exchange rates ratio (reer).
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Table 3: Results by sector groups(1) (2)Heavy*industry Light*industry0.024** 0.017***(0.011) (0.006)
Control'variables 0.023 <0.028**(0.019) (0.012)0.014 0.127***(0.051) (0.028)<0.001 <0.007***(0.004) (0.003)0.382** 0.176**(0.163) (0.085)0.193** 0.081*(0.081) (0.042)
Gravity'Variables <0.014* <0.024***(0.008) (0.004)0.021 <0.013(0.016) (0.008)0.015 <0.016***(0.010) (0.006)<0.017 0.023***(0.014) (0.008)
Lagged'dep.'Vars. 0.826*** 0.905***(0.031) (0.013)0.116*** 0.007(0.029) (0.018)0.029* 0.040***(0.018) (0.012)Country<pair*sect.*FE Presamp PresampImporter*and*exporter*dum. Yes YesSector*dummies Yes YesYear*FE Yes YesObservations 63477 166003
Trade_ij(t<3)
DistanceCommon*currencyContiguityCommon*official*lang.
Trade_ij(t<1)Trade_ij(t<2)
GDP*similarity
Eenergy*price*gap
Wage*gapReal*eff.*ex*rate*ratioRelative*fact.*endow.GDP*total
Notes: *,**,***= significant at 10,% 5%, 1%. . Standard errors clustered at the country pair level in parentheses.
The dependent variable is the value of annual bilateral imports. Estimation is by Poisson pseudo-maximum
likelihood. The country-pair-sector fixed effect is a pre-sample mean of the dependent variable over the years
1996-2000. All regressions include controls for wage differences, real effective exchange rates ratio, relative factor
endowments, overall economic size of the two trading partners, GDP similarity, population weighted distance
between trading partners, and dummies for common currency, contiguity and common official language. All
regressions include dummies for years, importer, exporter and sectors.
16
impacts of carbon pricing has been explored in partial equilibrium modelling for Europe’s
heavy industry, as well as in econometric analysis for the EU production sectors (Demailly &
Quirion, 2008). This section examines whether similar evidence can be found for a wider
geographical scope, taking advantage of the fact that our energy price variable epgapijst
captures variations in energy prices not only across country-pairs but also across sectors.
In order to explore the heterogeneity of the impact of energy prices on imports we run the
model separately for heavy industry and light industry sectors. The list of sectors included
in heavy and light industry is available in Table 8 in the Appendix.
The results of our estimations are presented in Table 3. The results give support to the notion
that the impacts of the energy price gap on trade are heterogeneous across sectors depending
on their energy intensity. The coefficient is positive and statistically significant for both heavy
and light manufacturing. However, the effect is larger in the heavy manufacturing sector
with an elasticity of 0.024. This is around 50% higher than in light manufacturing (0.017)
and larger than the average impact uncovered in section 4.1 but still fairly small.
4.3 Magnitude of the effect
To obtain a better sense of the magnitude of the results, in this section we investigate
how much of the overall variation in sectoral bilateral trade is explained by energy price
differences. We start by a simple example. Between 2005 and 2006, India’s iron and steel
sector’s real energy price index increased from from 5.03 to 5.09. Over the same period,
the real energy price index for the same sector in the UK increased from 5.61 to 5.71. This
implies that over this period the energy price gap between the UK and India’s steel sector
increased by 4%11.
In section 4.2 we found that a 1% increase in the energy price gap in the heavy industry
sector was associated with a 0.027% increase in imports. Thus a 4% increase in the price gap
between the UK and India is predicted to increase UK’s imports in this sector by around
0.1%. However during the same period, India’s iron and steel exports to the UK actually
grew by 33%. The energy price gap is therefore explaining 0.3% of the observed change in
trade volumes.
This example illustrates the small contribution of the variation in energy prices in the
overall variation in trade flows in the iron and steel sector. We now generalise this example
and analyse the contribution of energy price changes to the overall variance in bilateral
trade flows for the two broad sector categories – heavy- and light-industry. To do so we
11exp(5.71   5.61)/exp(5.09   5.03) = 1.04. Recall that the energy price gap is defined as epgapijst =
ln(EPist)  ln(EPjst) = ln
⇣
EPist
EPjst
⌘
.
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calculate the change in trade flows predicted by our model and compare this to the observed
change in trade flow for each observation in our sample. The contribution of energy prices
to the variance of trade flows across these sectors is extremely small – around 0.01% for
the heavy industry sectors, and even smaller for light industry. This shows that other
explanatory factors, such as underlying trends in transport costs, globalisation and supply
chain integration, population growth and economic growth play a much more important
role in the variation in trade over time than do energy costs.
4.4 Robustness checks
We conducted a large number of robustness checks and report the main ones below.
Alternative specifications: As explained in section 2.3, the pre-sample mean Poisson pseudo-
maximum likelihood estimator is our preferred estimator, as it is able to address the key
characteristics of the data – the combination of fixed effects with lagged dependent variables,
the skewed distribution of the dependent variable and the large number of dummy variables.
However, we also analyse the sensitivity of our results to the use of alternative models, in
line with the recent gravity model trade literature (Gómez-Herrera, 2013). In column (2) of
Table 4, we use the Hausman, Hall and Griliches (HHG) method to account for country-
pair-sector fixed effects, even though the assumption of strict exogeneity underlying HHG is
problematic in our context, as we have a highly dynamic specification. The coefficient is still
highly statistically significant and higher than in our baseline model (but not statistically
significantly so). In column (3), we reproduce the same specification as in column (4) of Table
2 (also reproduced in column 1 of Table 4) but use a negative binomial estimator instead,
which might be better able to handle the large overdispersion of the dependent variable. The
coefficient is smaller but in line with our baseline model.
Fixed effects specification: Baltagi et al. (2003) experiment with eight different fixed effects
models and show the importance of controlling for a full interaction of importer-time and
exporter-time fixed effects to analyse bilateral trade flows and thus purge the estimates
from a large number of possible confounding factors. In column (4), importer by year and
exporter by year fixed effects ait and ajt are included to control for common macroeconomic
shocks at the country level, such as the sharp fall in global trade volumes following the
financial crisis in 2008 which may have differently affected countries around the world. We
find that the coefficient is smaller than the baseline specification, suggesting that if anything
the already small elasticity of trade to energy prices might even be slightly overestimated.
Lagged dependent variable selection: As explained in Section 2.1, we experimented with
various dynamic specifications. Columns (5), (6) and (7) in Table 4 show the results of our
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Table 4: Sensitivity analysis results 1
Baseline(model Alternative(fixed(effects(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)Poisson Poisson(fe Negative(binomial Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson0.021*** 0.055*** 0.012* 0.011** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.015** 0.020***(0.006) (0.014) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Control'variables 0.001 E0.016 0.000 0.008 0.006 0.002 0.001 E0.002 E0.002(0.009) (0.020) (0.000) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)0.053** 0.077** 0.142*** E0.220*** 0.040 0.049* 0.053** 0.051* 0.053**(0.027) (0.038) (0.028) (0.073) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027)E0.003 E0.057 E0.007*** E0.002 E0.003 E0.003 E0.003 E0.003 E0.003(0.002) (0.061) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)0.114 0.800*** 0.176** E0.035** 0.215*** 0.157** 0.112 0.081 0.112(0.096) (0.085) (0.085) (0.016) (0.070) (0.072) (0.074) (0.101) (0.097)0.053 0.162* 0.081* E0.022*** 0.104*** 0.074** 0.052 0.037 0.052(0.048) (0.090) (0.042) (0.008) (0.035) (0.036) (0.037) (0.051) (0.048)
Gravity'Variables E0.018** E0.063*** E0.021*** E0.021*** E0.020*** E0.019*** E0.018*** E0.020***(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)E0.006 E0.007 E0.008 E0.011 E0.008 E0.008 E0.007 E0.009(0.016) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)0.018* E0.024* E0.006 E0.005 E0.003 E0.003 E0.002 E0.003(0.010) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)0.002 0.002 0.007 0.011 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009(0.012) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Lagged'dep.'Vars. 0.860*** 0.598*** 0.856*** 0.881*** 0.947*** 0.881*** 0.879*** 0.878*** 0.880***(0.015) (0.012) (0.016) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)0.074*** 0.010 0.100*** 0.060*** 0.088*** 0.059*** 0.058*** 0.058***(0.020) (0.013) (0.017) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)0.055*** 0.005 0.051*** 0.046*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.041***(0.015) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)E0.002(0.008)CountryEpair(sect.(FE Presamp Yes Presamp Presamp Presamp Presamp Presamp Presamp PresampImporter(and(exporter(dum. Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes YesimpEyr,(expEyear(dum. No No No Yes No No No No NoSector(fixed(effects Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes YesYear(FE Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes YesObservations 317382 309085 329873 317382 317382 317382 312588 310650 317067
Alternative(model LDV(selection Alternative(energy(price
Trade_ij(tE3)Trade_ij(tE4)
DistanceCommon(currencyContiguityCommon(official(lang.
Trade_ij(tE1)Trade_ij(tE2)
Eenergy(price(gap
Wage(gapReal(eff.(ex(rate(ratioRelative(fact.(endow.GDP(totalGDP(similarity
Notes: *,**,***= significant at 10,% 5%, 1%. The dependent variable is the annual bilateral imports expressed in
value terms. Standard errors clustered at the country pair level in parentheses. Estimation is by PPML , with
two exceptions. Column (2) uses Poisson fixed effects and column (3) uses negative binomial. All regressions
include controls for wage differences, real effective exchange rates ratio, relative factor endowments, overall
economic size of the two trading partners and GDP similarity. Gravity variables are included in all columns
except (2), which include the population weighted distance between the trading partners, and dummies for
common currency, contiguity and common official language. Column (2) uses country-pair-sector fixed effects,
while other columns use a pre-sample mean. All regressions include year dummies, except column (4) which
uses importer-year and exporter-year dummies. Importer and exporter dummies and sectors dummies are
included in all columns other than (2) and (4).
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Table 5: Sensitivity analysis results 2
Contemporaneous First.lag.(baseline) Second.lag(1) (2) (3)Poisson Poisson Poisson0.013** 0.021*** 0.008(0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Control'variables 0.013 0.001 0.010(0.010) (0.009) (0.008)0.087*** 0.053** 0.031(0.028) (0.027) (0.026)C0.006*** C0.003 C0.007***(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)C0.087 0.114 C0.300***(0.094) (0.096) (0.079)C0.047 0.053 C0.153***(0.047) (0.048) (0.040)
Gravity'Variables C0.012*** C0.018** C0.004(0.004) (0.007) (0.004)C0.005 C0.006 0.008(0.008) (0.016) (0.008)0.006 0.018* 0.011*(0.006) (0.010) (0.006)0.006 0.002 0.003(0.007) (0.012) (0.007)
Lagged'dep.'Vars. 0.898*** 0.860*** 0.902***(0.009) (0.015) (0.010)0.047*** 0.074*** 0.046***(0.010) (0.020) (0.012)0.038*** 0.055*** 0.035***(0.008) (0.015) (0.009)CountryCpair.sect..FE Presamp Presamp PresampImporter.and.exporter.dum. Yes Yes YesimpCyr,.expCyear.dum. No No NoSector.fixed.effects Yes Yes YesYear.FE Yes Yes YesObservations 348771 317382 229962
Trade_ij(tC3)
DistanceCommon.currencyContiguityCommon.official.lang.
Trade_ij(tC1)Trade_ij(tC2)
Energy.price.gap
Wage.gapReal.eff..ex.rate.ratioRelative.fact..endow.GDP.totalGDP.similarity
Notes: *,**,***= significant at 10,% 5%, 1%. The dependent variable is the annual bilateral imports expressed
in value terms. Standard errors clustered at the country pair level in parentheses. Estimation is by PPML. All
regressions include controls for wage differences, real effective exchange rates ratio, relative factor endowments,
overall economic size of the two trading partners, GDP similarity, year dummies, the population weighted
distance between the trading partners, and dummies for common currency, contiguity and common official
language. All regressions include year dummies, importer and exporter dummies and sectors dummies.
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baseline specification when including respectively one, two and four lags of the dependent
variable. The results are remarkably stable across these various specifications.
Specification of the energy price gap: To test the possibility that the estimated effects are
sensitive to the specification of the energy price gap variable, we used different time period
to construct the energy mix weights underlying the variable. We use weights based on a
pre-sample period in column (8) and weights based on 2010 in column (9). None of these
variants of the price variable change the results substantially.
Energy price dynamics: Table 5 reports alternative dynamic specifications for the energy
price gap variable. We use energy prices dated in the current year in column (1), lagged
one year in our (baseline) of column (2) and lagged two years in column (3). Using
contemporaneous prices returns very similar results to the lagged price, but the coefficient
on energy prices in year t  2 is not statistically significant. This suggests that the reaction of
trade to changes in relative energy prices is quick.
5 Simulating the trade impacts of carbon pricing policies
In this section we explore the implications of our econometric models for the evolution of
future trade flows and how these may be affected by asymmetric changes in the price of
energy implied by unequal carbon pricing policies. Few meaningful carbon prices were in
place during the time period covered in the data, so that energy price variations have thus
far been mostly driven by factors other than climate policies. However, it is likely that the
threats posed by climate change will require carbon emissions regulations that lie far outside
the bounds of past experience. For example, as part of the “2030 framework for climate
and energy policies”, the European Union has committed itself to reduce its greenhouse
gas emissions by at least 40% in 2030 compared to 1990. The “Roadmap for moving to a
low-carbon economy” further suggests that, by 2050, the EU should cut its emissions to 80%
below 1990 levels.
Large industrial energy users in the EU have been regulated under the EU Emissions
Trading System since 2005. During the period 2005-2011, the average carbon price was
around 14.5†/tCO2.12 The 40% greenhouse gas emissions reductions target for 2030 implies
considerably higher prices on the European carbon market than the ones observed between
2005-2011. According to Thomson Reuters Point Carbon, the price of carbon should reach
65†/tCO2 in 2030, which corresponds to a 50†/tCO2 increase from the average 2005-2011
level. Further carbon emissions reductions in line with 2050 targets are likely to push the
12The average annual EUA price in Phase I was 22 .3 †/tCO2e (2005), 15.1 †/tCO2e (2006), 1.3 †/tCO2e (2007),
and 15.5†/tCO2 in Phase II (2008-2012).
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price up above the 100†/tCO2 level. Given the large uncertainty around the energy price
increase from carbon pricing, we simulate two scenarios whereby energy prices were 10%
and 30% higher throughout Europe than was actually observed. This implies that the average
EU ETS carbon price would have been higher by 25-50†/tCO2 for the 10% energy price
increase scenario, and by 50-100†/tCO2 for the 30% scenario, assuming no free allowance
allocation (thus the EU sectors face the full impact of carbon pricing) according to a recent
study by the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change13 (UK Department of Energy
and Climate Change, 2011). Using our econometric model, we simulate the impact of a
10% and a 30% increase in energy prices across Europe on the EU’s imports and exports,
assuming no change in energy prices in the rest of the world. Applying this range of energy
price increases induces a significant change in the size of the energy price gap between the
EU and its trading partners. Table 6 presents the predicted impacts on Europe’s imports and
exports14. EU imports are predicted to increase by 0.04% following a 10% increase in energy
prices (corresponding to a 40-65 †/tCO2 price) and by 0.07 % following a 30% increase in
energy prices (corresponding to a 65-115 †/tCO2 price). Exports are predicted to decline by
0.2% to 0.5%.15 To put things into perspective, consider that imports to European countries
have grown at an average annual rate of 6.5% between 1995 and 2011 and at the rate of 15.6%
since 2009. Hence, the impact of ambitious unilateral climate change mitigation policies in
Europe on trade appears limited. Our estimates are smaller but comparable to the study by
Aldy & Pizer (2011) which finds that an 8% increase in the US electricity prices would lead
to an approximately 1% decline in net trade.
6 Conclusion
As countries strengthen carbon pricing policies at different speeds, there is considerable
interest around the potential trade impacts particularly for the energy intensive trade-exposed
13The study conducted by the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change estimates that the average
impact of all energy and climate change policies on business energy (gas & electricity) bills, including UK
policies and the EU ETS, compared with bills in the absence of policies for large energy intensive users is
between 6-36% assuming a 30GBP/tCO2 EU ETS price in 2020 (DECC, 2011). Energy price impacts are likely to
vary considerably according to the energy profile of users (e.g. gas intensive or electricity intensive) as well as
model assumptions. Of this estimated range of impacts, a third is attributable to the EU ETS, and two thirds
to other climate policies such as the Renewables Obligations support costs. Hence the energy price increase
attributable to the EU ETS with 30GBP/tCO2is between 2 - 12% compared to the case with no EU ETS. Using
average exchange rate between 2005-2011, 30GBP/tCO2is approximated at 35†/tCO2. Instead with a carbon
price assumption of 70GBP/tCO2, the same study predicts industry energy price rise of between 13-60%, the
third of which is attributable to the EU ETS (4-20%).
14We assume that the impact of the carbon price on energy prices is similar in all European countries, hence
intra-EU trade is not affected.
15The empirical model’s structure is such that it yields common elasticities for imports and exports. However
some asymmetry can arise between the impact on imports and exports because of differences in sectoral
compositions of the EU’s imports and exports.
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Table 6: Predicted impact of EU ETS carbon prices on EU imports and exports
Change in EU
energy prices
Implied change
in carbon price
Impact on imports Impact on exports
+10% +25-50 †/tCO2 +0.04% -0.2%
+30% +50-100 †/tCO2 +0.07% -0.5%
sectors. This paper measures the response of bilateral trade to differences in industrial energy
prices, using a 16 year panel dataset that includes 42 countries and 62sectors (covering 80%
of global merchandise trade). The coverage and detailed disaggregation of the data used
goes well beyond previous work, allowing the first global ex-post analysis of the relationship
between trade and energy prices.
We find evidence that changes to the relative energy price between countries have a stat-
istically significant impact on bilateral trade. This result is robust to various estimation
techniques and to a wide number of sensitivity tests. The magnitude of this effect, however,
is small. A 10% increase in the price of energy in the importer country relative to the exporter
country increases imports by around 0.2%. Though slightly larger, the effect remains small
in heavy industries, suggesting that trade in energy-intensive sectors may be more resilient
to higher energy prices than previously thought.
The findings in this paper suggest that the concerns around short-term impacts on carbon
leakage and competitiveness are not entirely ungrounded, but that such concerns may have
been overstated, so that concerns around carbon leakage and competitiveness need not
dictate the design of carbon mitigation policy instruments. Importantly, the elasticities
obtained in this study can be interpreted in a broader geographical context compared to
previous studies which examined only industrialised countries. This is important, because
carbon pricing policies are being implemented across the world, and carbon leakage is no
longer a rich nation’s problem. For example, carbon leakage concerns have been raised
following China’s pledge to achieve significant GDP energy intensity reduction targets
largely through changes in sectoral composition of GDP (Tekes, 2011). The estimations from
this study predict that changes of production do not imply large changes in trade patterns,
at least in the short-term.
An important limitation of our study is that by definition, ex-post empirical evaluations
can only cover past or existing policies, but the possibility of larger effects on trade in the
future cannot be ruled out if efforts in pollution control diverge significantly across countries.
There are stark divergences in the political will to tackle climate change among developed
countries’ governments, as exemplified by Australia’s decision to abolish carbon taxes in
2014 and Germany’s ambitious energy transition programme (Energiewende) which aims to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 80-95 percent by 2050. The regulatory gap might also
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increase between some emerging economies such as China, Brazil, South Korea, Malaysia
and India, which all play a key role in trade and global supply chains. Our results might not
be valid for much larger energy price differences across countries than those observed over
the last decades.
A key issue for future research is thus to improve the identification of specific economic
activities where pollution leakage and competitiveness issues represent a genuine risk; for
these specific activities, to assess the various policy options available to prevent adverse
impacts on trade whilst avoiding the creation of new distortions; and to determine how
environmental policies should be adjusted as other countries’ regulations evolve. To carry
out these sector-level analyses, more detailed data on actual energy prices faced by sectors
is necessary. One of the limitations to this analysis is the lack of observed sector-level
disaggregation in the energy price information. The sectoral level variation in the energy
price data currently available is estimated using variation in energy mix across sectors, but
actual energy prices faced by sectors might vary because of different degrees of competition
or the types of contracts used in the industry. As more detailed data become available,
incorporating this variation into the analysis will likely enable more robust estimations at
the sector level. This is left for future research.
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Appendix
Table 7: List of countries and sectors
2-digit SITC (Rev. 3) sectors included
Countries Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China,
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Kazakhstan, South Korea, Lithuania, Mexico, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Foundation,
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States
Sectors Animal feed, Animal oils, Apparel products, Beverages, Chemical
products, Coal and coke, Coffee and tea, Cork and wood, Cork and
wood manufacturers, Cereals, Crude animal and vegetable
materials, Crude fertilisers, Crude rubber, Dairy products, Dyeing
materials, Electrical machinery, Essential oils and perfume,
Fertilisers, Fish, Footwear, Furniture, General industrial machinery,
Gold, Hides and skin, Industrial machinery, Inorganic Chemicals,
Iron and steel, Leather manufactures, Live animals, Meat, Metal
manufacturing, Metal ores and scrap, Metalworking machinery,
Non ferrous metals, Non metallic minerals, Non-primary plastics,
Office machinery, Oil seeds, Organic chemicals, Other foods, Other
manufacturing, Other transport equipment, Paper and paperboard,
Petroleum products, Pharmaceuticals, Photographic and optical
goods, Power generation equipment, Prefabricated buildings,
Primary plastics, Processed animal and veg oils, Pulp and waste
paper, Road vehicles, Rubber manufactures, Scientific instruments,
Sugars, Telecom machinery, Textile fibres, Textile yarn and fabric,
Tobacco, Travel goods, Vegetable fats and Vegetables and fruit.
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Table 8: Broad sectors groups
2-digit SITC (Rev. 3) sectors included
Heavy industry Chemical products; Coal & coke; Crude fertilisers; Fertilisers;
Inorganic chemicals; Iron & Steel; Non-metallic minerals;
Non-ferrous metals; Organic chemicals; Paper & paper board;
Petroleum products; Pulp and waste paper.
Light industry Apparel products; Beverages; Cork and wood manufactures; Dairy
products; Dyeing materials; Electrical Machinery; Essential oils and
perfume; Footwear; Furniture; General industrial machinery;
Industrial machinery; Leather manufactures; Metal manufacturing;
Metalworking machinery; Non-primary plastic manufactures; Other
foods; Other transport equipment; Pharmaceuticals; Power
generation equipment; Photographic and optical goods; Processed
animal and vegetable oils; Prefabricated buildings; Primary plastics;
Road vehicles; Rubber manufactures; Scientific instruments;
Telecom machinery; Textile fibres; Textile yarn and fabric; Travel
goods.
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